We end this course as we started it; with speculation about the nature of consciousness, and how this relates to the historical search for our own true nature;

http://floyddogdesign.com/sean/Lectures/Lecture11.html

First of all, there is a classic split often construed as between the left hemisphere “analytical” and right hemisphere “intuitive”. Perhaps of more interest is the extent to which we confabulate. In fact, conscious events occur much more slowly than neural process in general, and we are getting just a sketchy sample.

Several explanatory frameworks are then explored, including that of LaBerge. We end by looking at what we've learned about ourselves from this course; how will, self, and consciousness are interrelated

Before we summarize the vista afforded by this course, we need to visit two cognitive theories of mind, those of Jean Piaget and Jerry Fodor;

http://floyddogdesign.com/sean/Lectures/Lecture10.html

Piaget is perhaps wrong in all his findings, but he asked critical questions about how the development of knowledge informs us about the nature of knowledge. We are after all primates who think they originated in a Savannah; how is it we know about Quantum mechanics, the structure of the cosmos and so on?

While Piaget makes a valiant attempt to root knowledge in biology, Jerry Fodor is more in line with Noe et al by speaking in a mechanistic way about “modules” whose ensemble functioning are in some sense the mind.

 Just reiterating; the St Patrick's festival means that we have a lot of concerts to do so this is the second in the remainder of the course posted today

We continue to try and parse how sensory data are processed and the relationship of this process to consciousness in this lecture;

http://floyddogdesign.com/sean/Lectures/Lecture9.html

A first issue is how the brain represents external relations; space has to be turned into temporal relations. The fact is that the brain is opportunistic and we are going to learn much this century about topology in the brain.

A critical problem is how sensory data coming in from different sensory modalities are “bond” into one percept and we explore this.

We get very busy at my music business at this time of year, so I'm posting all remaining lectures today

We continue with the work of Noe and his colleagues before progressing on to Ramachandran and others in this lecture;

http://floyddogdesign.com/sean/Lectures/Lecture8.html

The first point is about synestheia, the attested ability to “see” odours, “smell” colours” and so on. Can Noe and his colleagues handle this? In any case, Noe et al press their attack on NCC's – and by implication on much consciousness “research” - by arguing that the situation is infinitely more complex than the “hard problem” scenario we have considered. In a rather Gothic experiment, a ferret's brain was cross-wired to show what they call “intermodal deference” (Since I recorded these lectures in 2009, my enunciated skepticism about the stats involved have been amply confirmed by Vul et alia as 2010 paper originally titled “Voodoo correlation...” and the ethics are suspect in the extreme)

However, Noe et al have a critical point; there are explanation gaps wrt “intermodal deference” and “intramodal deference” as well as the “hard problem”.Working in the same paradigm as Noe et al, Ramachandran managed to attest a cure for “phantom limb” phenomena. The lecture ens with speculation about 2 data highways in the brain

 We're at

http://floyddogdesign.com/sean/Lectures/Lecture7.html

The first issue in this lecture is that of methodology. It is my view that the focus on the so-called “hard problem” has retarded our area. This works on the assumption that “consciousness” will somehow yield itself to study when proper attention is paid to phenomenology and its interaction with the neural data. This statement is either wrong or trivial. References are given at the end; I have a forthcoming paper in “New ideas of Psych” called “NCC's of what” that I'll distribute to anyone who asks me for it..

The lecture focuses on a set of sophisticated replies. The most impressive is that of Alva Noe and his colleagues. For them , there is no problem of “consciousness”; there is a set of expectations lined up in the loop that Freeman identifies as “preafference”. The differential fulfillment of these expectations is what constitutes our experience. Yet this work really addresses only the sensorimotor level, and does not handle our symbolic and advanced social behaviour.

Sue Hurley and others work informatively on change “blindness” which, along with our continual narrations to ourselves, give us the impression of having much richer experience of the world than we actually have. Block parses consciousness into a- and p- categories. This also works to some extent.

The question should be left open in your heads of whether we really can remain in the academy – and that's where we are in this class- and expect full solutions about “consciousness”. Again, I have a forthcoming paper in “Cosmos and History” about this that I'll distribute to anyone who asks me for it..

Hi all

This next lecture is covered in the final chapter of my "search for Mind" (2003)

http://floyddogdesign.com/sean/Lectures/Lecture6.html

You can find a previous take on the ideas here;

Seán Ó Nualláin: Some Consequences of Current Scientific Treatments of Consciousness and Selfhood. AI Soc. 8(4): 305-314 (1994)

Now we are embarking on the last really technical neuroscience lecture;

http://floyddogdesign.com/sean/Lectures/Lecture5.html

 There are three references at the end – I recommend reading  my 2008 paper first,  and then moving on to Walter’s. The  reference to the paper  we did together, which should be read last,  is in a small font; it’s at 

http://www.mendeley.com/research/simulating-cortical-background-activity-at-rest-with-filtered-noise/

I need some feedback now to assess people’s understanding before we move on